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This work is an analysis of the use of a multilevel
secure computer system to execute tactical combat
applications programs. Using the Gemini Trusted Multiple
Microcomputer Base, currently under evaluation by the
Department of Defense Computer Security Center, applications
and test programs were written and implemented in order to
expose some characteristics of the system.
Using a Janus/Ada compiler with the necessary library
alterations for the Gemini machine, a simple weapons
application program was implemented in a system designed to
simulate a tactical environment where classified material
can be handled in spite of the different levels of security
held by the operators that can access the system.
The loss in performance due to the secure operating
system's overhead is estimated in order to establish the
tradeoffs in performance gains due to parallel processing
capability of the multiprocessor system.
cr--
THESIS DISCLAIMER
The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed
during this research are not completely validated. Although
every effort has been made in order to make the programs
free of computational and logical errors, the time available
was not sufficient to perform a fully reliable job.
Documentation and software used in this work were supplied
by the manufacturers of the microcomputer used , in a
preliminary format with updates being received throughout
the research period.
Some terms used in this thesis are registered trademarks
of commercial products. All trademarks appearing in this
thesis will be listed below following the firm holding the
trademark
:
1. Gemini Computers Inc. Monterey, California.
Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base.
GEMSOS
2. RR Software Inc. Madison, Wisconsin.
Janus/Ada development package.
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This thesis investigates the use of a multilevel secure
computer system in a tactical combat environment . The
specific application of the system proposed is to perform
the duties of a real-time system with the extra ability to
handle sensitive information in a trusted manner.
A real-time system is defined as:
A system that reacts as to affect the environment in which
it is operating. It is a collection of devices,
controlled by a stored program of instructions . This
program acts as the regulating element in a feedback loop,
which then forms part of a system. [Ref. 1: p.l]
Sensitive information is defined as a collection of data
that cannot be accessed but by those who have specific
authorization
.
The type of environment where a secure tactical system
can be implemented is shown in Figure 1.1 , which depicts a
hypothetical section of the operation's room of a combat
ship
.
The tactical program executed by this specific system
requires some secret data, in order to produce the desired
results. The system should allow the tactical program to
access the secret data, make the necessary computations and
transfer the result to the desired peripheral. The operator
who "drives" the tactical program should not have direct
INPUT
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Figure l.l A Tactical Secure Environment
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access to . the secret data. The eventual access to the
secret data, i.e. to update some parameters, should be
allowed only to operators with secret clearance or above.
Another important aspect of a tactical secure combat
system is that the tactical program needs to be maintained
by on-board technicians, who might not have secret
clearance. If a "free" access to the secret data is
allowed, a skillfull maintainer with some corrupt
intentions , can easily produce a "patch" which will extract
the sensitive information and transfer to a printer- or a
display. This dangerous picture is very much likely to
exist and in fact, such a problem ocurred two years ago on
board of an aircraft carrier, involving the geographic
positions of U.S. Navy's nuclear submarines.
In order to avoid the necessity to clear all the
maintainers on-board to secret level, some sort of
independence should exist between the modules of a tactical
program. The modules should be able to receive different
security labels that cannot be changed by on-board
maintenance. The modules authorized to be maintained on
board should be re-integrated into the system with no
changes to the security parameters.
Since tactical environment automatically calls for
speed, all the necessary security techniques must not- create
too much overhead to the overall performance.
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This research was performed in conjunction with the
Naval Postgraduate School's AEGIS Modelling Group. This
group is sponsored by the AEGIS Combat System Project Office
to conduct research in the area of combat system
development
.
To summarize the problems discussed in this section we
can state the following requirements for a tactical secure
combat system.-
1) The system will execute tactical programs that uses
sensitive information;
2) The access to the sensitive information should be
controlled
;
3) The tactical programs need to have an on-board
-maintenance by technical personnel with no clearance
to the sensitive information;
4) Changes to the security parameters should not be
possible unless by authorised personnel
;
5) There should be no large overhead due to the security
aspects of the system.
B. PROPOSED SOLUTION
This thesis proposes the use of a multilevel secure
computer system to execute the tactical combat program. The
secure computer system would be the "heart" of the proposed
system, executing the application program specifically
designed for each different situation. The multilevel
secure computer system, based upon the security level of the
operator currently logged on, would perform different kinds
of functions. The capacity of labeling the modules of
12
execution in a multilevel secure computer system would allow
the isolation of sensitive modules , thus protecting them
against unauthorized users
.
An schematic view of the proposed solution is shown in
Figure 1.2.
Here, an application program would be delivered to the
ship's system containing five independent modules. Module 1
is the "master" module, which controls the execution of the
whole system and performs tne synchronization between
modules. It would not be permitted to maintain this module
on-boara. Modules 2 and 3 contain algorithms to process
inputs and outputs and some intermediate calculations
.
Those modules can be maintained on-board. Module 4 accesses
the secret data, and cannot be maintained on-board. Module
5 contains the secret data, and cannot be maintained
on-board although alteration of some specific fields can be
done by an authorized operator
.
When an unclassified operator logs on, the master module
will activate modules 2 and 3, which will execute and call
module 4 to access the secret data. The secret data is
then, handled only by module 4 which provides the result :
f
the operation requested by modules 2 and 3, but will never
transmit the information read from module 5.
When a "secret" operator logs on, the master module will
activate directly module 4, which accesses module 5, but



















Figure 1.2 A Secure Processes Interaction
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operator whose "secret" classification ievel authorizes
access to tne information
.
There are several systems being currently evaluated by
the Department of Defense to operate as a multilevel secure
system. The Gemini Trusted Multiple Computer Base is the
one used in this research. This system is still undergoing
development and so, some restrictions were imposed.
C. THESIS FORMAT
This thesis is composed of five chapters ordered in a
sequence to provide the reader with a presentation of the
problem, some background information in secure systems and
then introduce the design and the implementation of a system
to execute tactical secure combat programs
.
Chapter I presents the problem and the solution in a
generic format.
Chapter II describes the concepts of multilevel security
and provides some detailed information about the
microcomputer used in this research, the Gemini Trusted
Multiple Computer Base.
Chapter III discusses the actual design of the
application program for the proposed system
.
Chapter IV covers the implementation and testing of the
application program using the Gemini system. Some
information about loss in performance due to overhead caused
by security checks is included in this chapter.
15
Chapter V analyzes the results, proposes some techniques








There is not to date an unique and generally
accepted definition for a trusted computer system
.
Depending on the origin (i.e., business or government), the
requirements can be quite different and sometimes tney even
conflict between each other. The Department of Defense,
with the purpose to define parameters for any work in the
area- - of secure systems, has elaborated a document which is
entitled DOD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria and
was published in 1983 [Ref. 2] . This document established
guidelines for the test and evaluation of any new system
involving security aspects. It contains all the information
necessary to anyone involved in research with trusted
computer systems.
One of the important concepts described in this
publication, which has direct effect in the analysis
executed in this thesis, is the establishment of two basic
types of security policy: Mandatory (sometimes called Non-
discretionary) and Discretionary Security.
Mandatory Security is defined by the following
direct quote.
Security policies defined for systems that are used to
process classified or other specifically categorized
17
sensitive information include provisions for the
enforcement of mandatory access control rules. That is,
must include a set of rules for controlling access based
directly on a comparison of the individual's clearance or
authorization for the information and the classification
or sensitivity designation of the information being
sought, and indirectly on considerations of physical and
other environmental factors of control . The mandatory
access control rules must accurately reflect the laws
,
regulations, and general policies from which they are
derived. [Ref. 2: p. 72]
As it can be understood from the definition above,
the mandatory policy is expressed by a lattice of access
classes. The mandatory policy establishes that the control
of the accesses is based on an access level determined by
the user's security clearance and this policy cannot be
modified or bypassed within the system. The mandatory
policy, furthermore, establishes the limits for the
discretionary security, which is an additional set of
constraints on access to information, based on some
particular constraint, like the military "need-to-know"
policy
.
The Discretionary Security is the second type of
security policy established by the DOD document and it is
expressed by direct quote which follows
.
Security policies that are defined for systems that are
used to process classified or other sensitive information
must include provisions for the enforcement of
discretionary access control rules. That is, they must
include a consistent set of rules for controlling and
limiting access based on identified individuals who have
been determined to have a need-to-know for the
information. [Ref. 2: p. 73]
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There -will be certain situations where although the
elements of a group, involved in an analysis or a research
project may have the same clearance, the manager wants to
limit the type of information which each one should access
.
This can be done in order to extract different and unbiased
opinions and observations
. The discretionary policy is the




The attractive field of computer technology has had
in the past few years one of the fast and impressive
developments ever observed in a new science. This has lead
to a proliferation of computers and networks so that it is
improbable to find today any company or organization that
does not use some kind of a computer system.
Among all the information stored, some is
classified, and so, need special care. The few and basic
security controls first used were considered sufficient to
limit the access to classified information. The machines
were physically isolated and locked. Some more
sophisticated systems had a software coded control . As it
has always happened in human history, there is always a
conflict of interests and there is almost no limit to the
human desire and dedication. So, the computer "hackers"
entered the scene and there has been a lot of break-ins
widely reported by the press , in many types of computer
19
systems. The control processes had to be improved and the
break-in techniques improved concurrently!
The only very low break-in probability technique ended
up to be the enclosure of the peripheral, which permits
access to the classified information, in a tightly secured
vault. Evidently this is not a satisfactory solution. In
some tactical applications, for instance, the operators
might have no secret clearance, but the data the tactical
program uses, is secret. A bright and "interested" operator
can use this situation to create a software patch, for
example, which although transparent to the normal operation
of :the system, will extract some of the classified
information that is stored somewhere.
3 . Proposed Technology
Research centers and universities have conducted a
great amount of work and fortunately, some very good results
are now available to be implemented. The security kernel
technology [Ref . 3] has been considered the driving force
for the building of trusted computer systems and several
products have implemented and improved this technique in an
effort to turn the products into practical, simple to use,
and most of all, secure systems.
To determine if a system is secure or not, is a very
difficult task, starting with the problem to establish the
criteria to evaluate the performance. The Departament of
Defense is preparing a document which will contain the
20
details of such an evaluation criteria and this analysis is
not considered in this work.
The employment of secure products by potential
customers is usually not considered until some harmful
break-in happens, mainly because the practicality of its use
has not been demonstrated yet. In the tactical environment
there, are extra concerns like timing, adaptability and real-
time applicability that have to be demonstrated together
with the secure capabilities, in order to integrate these
products into a combat system.
The Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base using
the "Gemini Multiprocessing Secure Operating System (GEMSOS)
is claimed by its manufacturers to fulfill the tactical
requirements with secure aspects, and this was the machine
used in this research.
B. THE GEMINI SYSTEM
1 . General
.
The Gemini Multiprocessing Secure Operating System
(GEMSOS) was designed for the Gemini Trusted Multiple
Microcomputer Base, in order to have the system to operate
at the B3 [Ref. 2] level of classification, although the
ultimate goal is to meet the class Al , the highest level
defined. The system is currently under evaluation by the
Department of Defense Computer Security Center for
certification to the B3 class. The system was developed
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based on the security kernel technology [Ret, 3] like all
trusted systems are, and the main idea was to provide an
off-the-shelf product, using state of the art, hardware
components and software engineering techniques . The main
characteristics of the system are [Ref. 4]
:
1) Can operate with up to eight Intel APX-286 based
microcomputers in parallel, giving a great processing
power. The microcomputers communicate through shared
memory segments providing high throughput , and the
GEMSOS minimizes bus contention by locating data and
code in the local memory of each processor, whenever
it is possible.
2) The multiple microcomputers are capable of
multiprocessing and multiprogramming. The GEMSOS can
multiplex processes to a single processor or
distribute processes to several processors, so that
-•both parallel and pipeline processing is possible.
3) Concurrent computing is independent of the programming
language used, since the GEMSOS provides its own
primitives to manipulate the abstracts eventcounts and
sequencers , in order to support communication and
synchronization among processes
.
4) A variety of I/O devices and storage, which include
fixed disks, high density floppy diskette drives and
non-volatile memory, can be directly connected to the
Multibus. Each RS-232 interface board can handle up
to 'eight devices
.
5) The system includes some other features like a real
time clock, data encryption device (NBS-DES
algorithm), a system unique identifier to prevent
covert channels, and a non-volatile memory to store
passwords and encryption keys
.
The Gemini system allows the development of
applications programs using theoretically any language
supported by the CPM-86 operating system. Some additional
files, which will change the utility library associated with
the programming language, has to be provided with the Gemini
system. As the decision was to generate application
software using the Janus/Ada computer language, the actual
coding of this work had to wait the delivery of the
Janus/Ada environment software and documentation, which
happened in late March. There are special features for the
Gemini Janus/Ada environment that cannot be easily adapted
from a normal Janus/Ada code and these will be pointed out
later in this work. The current implementation of Janus/Ada
on GEMSOS still does not include the ability to use a
Janus/Ada process as the initial Ring 1 process and some
limitations result from that.
The claimed ability to handle different hardware
configurations is an important characteristic of the Gemini
system. If the system is going to be used in real tactical
applications, this certainly is an important aspect.
2 . Resource Management Concepts
A set of resource management services that can be
invoked by an application program is provided by the GEMSOS,
in order to provide the customer with tools to control the
performance of the particular implementation under
development. The application program uses what is called a
service call, which can be treated as a subroutine call,
with arguments being passed and returned. These service
calls are called gate calls, since they make certain
security checks to allow the flux of data. The actual
details of each call is specific to the language being used
23
and is supplied in the GEMSOS interface library provided
witn each compiler (Janus/Ada in this study).
The GEMSOS kernel is divided into three basic
management areas, which are: segment management, process
management and device management
.
a . Segment
Segments are discreet and logical objects
(entities) that contain all the information to be
manipulated in a Gemini system. The segments of concern to
the applications programmer are the code, data and stack
segments
.
~. The GEMSOS kernel allows some application
program to move data within the system in such a way as to
be immediate available to a particular process or not.
There are eight different calls provided for tnis
management. These calls will handle the movement, creation
and termination of data as well as the transfer of the
necessary information to the Kernel's mandatory security
model, which will deny or accept the request for service.
The segment manager controls a "Known Segment Table" (KST)
,
where the segment numbers are related to the system-unique
identifier of the segment usable by the memory. The segment
when created, will receive a tag associating it to a
particular collection of segments, called a volume, which is
the unit of secondary storage. A volume can be treated as
separate entity and so be called by a process. A detailed
24
description about each of the segment management calls is
contained in [Ref. 5].
b. Process
The management of a process includes the actual
management and the synchronization between processes
.
(1) Management . When created, each process is
uniquely identified by code, stack and data segments and at
the same time, a fixed amount of resources is assigned to
it. There are four primitives to manage a process.
(2) Synchronization . Once a segment is created
in an application program, an eventcount and a sequencer are
automatically associated with it. These two abstract
objects have the same name as their owning segment. The
process can then be synchronized with other processes by
means of four primitives supported by the kernel, which are:
advance, await, read and ticket.
c. Device
The Gemini system treats the management of
devices in a very peculiar way, which is, to reside most of
the functions dealing with I/O management in the code at the
application level. This design is two-fold. It reduces the
size of the kernel making verifications easier, but it also
makes the I/O applications software more difficult to be
coded. There are six calls to handle a device. The I/O
device controller is treated as a process , which is then
synchronized with the segments eventcounts and sequencers to
perform the desired functions
. More information about
device management, process management and synchronization,
can be found in [Ref. 5].
3 . The Operating System
The Intel APX-286 supports four protection levels
and GEMSOS uses them as four hierarchical rings to enforce
the security layering. They are numbered from to 3 ,
being the most privileged one. The mandatory and
discretionary policy are supported in rings and l
respectively. The mandatory policy, as already mentioned,
cannot be modified and is represented as a lattice of access
classes in the distributed kernel contained in ring 0. This
distributed kernel in ring will virtualize processors,
storage, I/O and objects (processes, segments and devices).
Ring 1 supports the discretionary policy and any other
security requirements. The supervisor, which is built on
the kernel, uses the virtualized objects to perform the
normal functions of an operating system. The other two
rings , 2 and 3 , are used by the programmers for the
development of applications.
The implementation of a reference monitor [Ref. 3]
is the base of the GEMSOS. All the access by the active
entities, subjects, to passive entities, objects, has to be
mediated by the reference monitor as shown in Figure 2.1.
All these checks are performed by the security
kernel located in ring 0. The subjects are processes
26
allowed to perform in a specific domain, and objects are
pieces of information that are observed or modified. Both
have security labels assigned to them. The result of the
comparison between the security labels of the subjects
















USER ACCESS, OBJECT SENSITIVITY
NEED-TO-KNOW ...
Figure 2.1 The Functions of a Reference Monitor
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security late! is a tag t-hat represents the access
class of an entity. This access class is defined as having
two components: a compromise level and an integrity level.
There are properties that establish the criteria for an
access to be granted based on the compromise and integrity
protection enforcement rules . These properties are listed
in [Ref. 4: pp. 16,17] and are summarized here as follows:
Compromise Properties
.
lj If a subject has "observe" access to an object, the
compromise access component of the subject must
dominate the compromise access component of the
object
.
2) If a subject has "modify" access to an object, the
- compromise access component of the object must




1) If a subject has "modify" access to an object, then
the integrity access component of the subject
dominates the integrity access component of the
object
2) If a subject has "observe" access to an object, then
the integrity access component of the object dominates
the integrity access component of the subject.
Compromise can be related to the secure distribution
of information, and integrity to the secure modification of
information. "Dominates" in the above properties, means
access level greater than or equal to the referred entity.
The number 1 property of both compromise and
integrity protections are the traditional security policies
which are called simple security properties. They state
that in order to observe/modify some information one has to
have a clearance at least equal to or greater than the
information referenced
.
The number 2 property, on the other hand, is not
usual and it is called the *-property (star property). The
purpose of this protection is to avoid an indirect
observation or modification of an entity by an "inferior"
one. In the compromise situation, for example, a secret
process could modify an unclassified file if this protection
did not exist. This "modification" could easily be the
transmission of secret data that the secret process has
access, to the unclassified file. In the integrity
situation, it prevents a secret process of observing an
unclassified file, and this observation could be "read some
data and include it in your computation" , which will allow
the secret process to be influenced by an unclassified user.
In [Ref . 6] there are some more comments about the types of
attacks (Trojan Horse) that can result if these properties
are not enforced
.
Ring integrity is enforced, in addition to all those
properties already mentioned, in the Gemini system. It
means that, subjects can only access objects with equal or
greater ring number, which enforces the hierarchical
structure of the rings.
The rigid observance of the properties mentioned
above, would transform the simple task of distributing
messages (when they have different access classes), into a
29
very complicated and resource consuming procedure. As the
Gemini system is a multilevel system, this would be the
case. In order to avoid this problem, the x -property for
compromise and integrity are relaxed within a certain range
of security levels. The process, which has certain
flexibility in order to execute some trusted activities, is
called "trusted" subject, and it is up to the application
programmer that his "trusted" process does not violate the
security policies. In GEMSOS , the implementation of
"trusted subjects" are in the form of multilevel subjects
and they are trusted within a range, demarcated by their
maximum and minimum access classes . As mentioned already
,
only subjects guaranteed not to improperly observe or modify
information, should be created as multilevel subjects.
Extreme caution should be emphazised when interfacing with
devices
.
The range of access classes for devices , should be
chosen depending on the physical location in which they
operate. Devices can be single level or multilevel, and the
classification is based on the data they manipulate , whether
they have a security label attached to it or not.
The security properties of single and multilevel




1) To receive ("read") information:
Process maximum compromise >=Device minimum compromise
Device maximum integrity }=Process minimum integrity
2) To send ("write") information:
Device maximum compromise }=Process minimum compromise
Process maximum integrity >=Device minimum integrity
Multi-level Device.
1) To receive ("read") information:
Process maximum compromise }=Device maximum compromise
Device minimum integrity >=Process minimum integrity
2) To send ("write") information:
Device minimum compromise >=Process minimum compromise
Process maximum integrity >=Device maximum integrity
4
. The NPS configuration
The Gemini system used during this research has the
following configuration:
1) one Intel APX-286 microcomputer
2) two 1.2 Mbyte floppy disk drives
3) one RS-232 interface board with a maximum of eight
ports
This system proved to be sufficient for the
execution of some preliminary processes like the ones
presented in this thesis. However, the amount of time
expended during compilation, linking and sysgening and the
constant swapping of floppy disks due to the floppy disk







The primary objective of this design was to develop
a model which would demonstrate the use of the Gemini
Trusted Mul-tiple Computer Base in a tactical combat
environment. Based on the requirements for a tactical
secure combat environment listed in the introductory
chapter, the model shown in Figure 3.1 is presented.
In this model , the Gemini computer would be used to
receive • the encoded data from a tracker radar, and transmit
some positioning information to a weapons device. The
actual devices being controlled in this model , are
irrelevant at this point. The application program executed
by the Gemini computer would make use, for the computation
of the results, of some stored information classified as
secret. This can be better understood, if we suppose that
the tracker radar is tracking an incoming missile, and the
desired response, is the firing of a chaff burst as a
defensive procedure. During the computation phase, the
program has to access data about our own ship which might be
classified. The operator controlling the tactical picture
cannot have direct access to his data. However this data









Figure 3.1 Tactical Combat Model
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in addition to all that, the system has to nave a
very fast response, and the steps of execution (reception of
radar data, computation of results, transmission or
position) have to be precisely synchronized.
2 . Hardware Simulation
The construction of the model described in the
previous section, would be ideal, since the attachment of
different devices to the Gemini computer would be tested.
Response time, encoding input techniques and many other
aspects would be revealed. This should be part of a follow-
up research
.
"_ As a preliminary research, the development of the
application program was considered the main task.
The complete model, will then be simulated as
follows: One terminal attached to a serial port is going to
simulate the radar input. The values sent to the "main"
process will be generated by software. Another terminal
will perform the same simulation of the weapon to be driven,
showing on the screen the transmitted values. The "main"
process will make use of the secret data stored in another
segment, simulating a secondary storage.
These simulations will not disturb the development
of the application program. The processes to be created in
order to perform the simulations described above, would be
necessary in the complete model as well. The- main
34
difference would be in the code itself, since the processes
would be executing controlling functions.
B. SOFTWARE DESIGN
The application software for this system was designed
using the modular programming construction technique. In
the particular case of the system used, which had a floppy
disk environment, this technique was very useful, because
the modules could be compiled separately. Unfortunately,
the testing of the modules cannot be done separately, when
the modules execute calls to the GEMSOS. To prepare a
program to be executed in the Gemini computer, which is
going" to be explained in a further section, takes about 15-
17 minutes, and the main process (the parent process) has to
be included always, since the creation of processes and
synchronization are coded in the main process
.
The application software was then divided in four
application programs
:
1) "THEMAIN", the parent process, containing the
initialization, creation of processes, synchronization
and deletion of processes ( log off).
2) "RADAR", a child process, performing the simulation of
the radar inputs , and the transmission of data to the
parent process
.
3) "COMPUTE", a child process, which receives data from
the "RADAR" process , execute some computations , and
tramsmit the results to the "CHAFF" process.
4) "CHAFF", a child process, which will receive data from
the "COMPUTE" process, and will simulate the
positioning of a weapon.
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1 . The Parent Process
This is the controlling process for the whole-
system. The creation of the child processes is established
in this module, together with the security parameters and
the synchronization scheme. This module has to be designed
and coded by a programmer cleared to the maximum level of
security to be used, since he will decide the levels for
each of the child processes to be created. The coding of
the child modules, will be given to different programmers,
depending upon the security level of the module.
The general algorithm for a parent process is shown
in Figure 3.2.
Package body THEMAIN is
begin
perform initialization;
create segment to be parent
;











Figure 3.2 Package THEMAIN
There are some other procedures, to transfer data to
and from the child processes, not shown here. They, can be
found in the program listing in Appendix A.
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2. The Child Processes
These processes will perform some defined function
which has been determined by the software manager. The
actual details of implementing the code are left to the
programmer in charge.
In our application program, the child modules
execute the general algorithm described in Figure 3.3.
This is just a general algorithm, and the full
listing of each module used in the application program
developed in this research, is shown in Appendix A.
Package CHILD body is
begin
receive data from parent
perform calculation;
execute simulation;
pass data to parent
;
end CHILD;
Figure 3.3 Package CHILD
As it was mentioned before, the child processes can
be maintained separately, as long as the synchronization
part of each module is not changed. If a module is to be
labelled as secret, the maintenance can be restricted to
Authorized personnel . The preparation of the complete
program to be executed in the system, will be done by a user
with the necessary level of security.
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C. SOFTWARE DESIGN GOALS
The configuration used for this research had some
restrictions, as already mentioned, and among them, the
amount of time necessary for each development step
represented considerable difficulty. The GEMSOS calls using
the Janus/Ada language are yet under development. A
preliminary version of the Janus/Ada software library and
manuals were received in March 86. Due to these reasons,
the following sequence of steps has been established for the
development of the application program:
1 ) Demonstrate the attachment and detachment of a
terminal
.
2)~ Demonstrate an application program which samples an
input device, performs calculations, and presents the
result, all synchronized sequentially.
3) Extract some information about overhead caused by some
GEMSOS calls.
4) Synchronize the application program via a real-time
clock
.
5) Label one of the child processes as secret, and test
the access for different operators
.
This research was performed in cooperation with
another student, Major Miguel Reyes, Peruvian Air Force,
who has one more quarter to work on this system. Hopefully,
the steps not accomplished by this thesis would be
demonstrated in his work.
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' IV. IMPLEMENTATION ON GEMINI SYSTEM
A. GEMSOS LIBRARY
When developing Janus/Ada application programs to run on
GEMSOS, the standard I/O and file type utilities provided
with the normal Janus/Ada compiler, cannot be used.
Instead, the GEMSOS gate calls provided by the
manufacturers, have to be used. As the Janus/Ada
environment provided for use with the GEMSOS, is not
complete yet, some of the utilities necessary for the
development of the application program had to be
constructed. Four packages were built to modularize the
procedures, functions and declarations
>
necessary for the
present application: MANAG , GEMIO, CRPROCE , TABLES.
1 . Package MANAG
This package includes rhe procedures necessary for
the management of segments and terminals . To create a
segment, a number of parameters should be passed to the
GEMSOS call CREATE_SEGMENT . These parameters are then
explicitly passed in this procedure.
Any device to be used by the Gemini system needs to
be attached. This applies to the screen terminal as well.
The GEMSOS call ATTACH_DEVICE , has a specific configuration
parameters which are used with terminals. The same applies
for the GEMSOS call DETACH_DEVICE . Two procedures were then
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built, in such a way that some parameters which are
constants for terminals do not have to be passed.
2. Package GEMIO
This package is designed to be the I/O package for
the Gemini system. The procedures included here, are the
ones found to be necessary up to this point of the research.
Evidently, many more have yet to be developed, in order to
have a comprehensive I/O package. Some of the procedures
included in this package were taken from the demonstration




In order to create a process, the general algorithm
presented in Figure 4.1 has to be applied.
Package body CREATE A PROCESS is
begin
makeknown the mentor segment
specify the address for the process stack
specify the address for the process code
specify the address for the process mentor
specify the address for the trap segment
calculate the stack size
create the segment for the stack
makeknown the segment for the stack
swap in this segment
create the segment for data
makeknown the segment for data
swap in this segment
complete the record for the CREATE_PROCESS call
call the GEMSOS CREATE_PROCESS
end CREATE A PROCESS
Figure 4.1 Package CRPROCE
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As it can De seen from Figure 4.1, the creation of a
process involves a large number of steps. The size of this
procedure alone, justifies the construction of a package
containing just this procedure.
4. Package TABLES
The purpose of this package is to concentrate a
great number of the declarations necessary for the
implemented application program. Since, as already
mentioned, the utilities programs coded in Janus/Ada have
not yet all been delivered, some procedure to supply the
parameters necessary for the create and makeknown calls, had
to be built. For the time being, a simple loop that will
generate fixed numbers is what will be used. A correct
procedure, which will look for the next free number to
allocate, should be done in the future. This package has a




1 . Pathname Convention
Since all information in the Gemini system is stored
in segments , some method to make reference to these segments
is needed . A pathname is the shorthand method used for this
purpose of aliasing a segment. It consists of a sequence of
entry numbers that together define all of the mentor
segments to a particular segment. The pathname "3,8"
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indicates that the target segment is at entry 8 of its
mentor segment, which itself has entry 3 in the system
mentor segment. Pathnames may be up to 5 entry numbers long
in the present implementation.
The pathname is used during the generation of a
program to run in the secure environment, and it will be
explained in the next sections
.
2 . Ring 1 Environment-
The current implementation of Janus/Ada on GEMSOS
does not allow the use of a Janus/Ada process as the initial
Ring 1 process. The Ring 1 Login and the Ring 1 Loader
provided have to used in order to run Janus/Ada programs
.
Another restriction imposed by this preliminary
version is that, the file R1TRAP.CMD, which contains the
trap handler and debugger, has to be sysgened (to be
discussed later), at entry six off the system mentor
segment. Figure 4.2 shows the Ring 1 environment segment
naming hierarchy. The segments which have fixed "positions"
in the ring 1 structure are shown in Figure a. 2, which are:
1) SSAT- System Segment Aliasing Table; containing the
bootstrap and kernel segments.
2) Vlloader- Ring 1 loader code segment.
3) Vllogon- Login process code segment.
4) NV . DS at 5,0- Shared segment for loader processes.
5) NV.DS at 5- Appliccation Root





Figure 4 . 2 Ring 1 Structure
The entry of concern for the applications
programmer, is entry number 5. In the current
implementation, this is the position were the application
program should be located.
3. Application Program Environment
The application program developed in this research,
is composed of four segments. The mentor segment for the
code segments (the application mentor) will be at entry 5
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off the system mentor. The mentor segment for the stack and
data segments will be at entry 5 off the application mentor.
The parent process will be located at entry off the
application mentor. The child processes will be located at
entries 7, 8 and 9 off the application mentor. This scheme







Figure ^ . 3 Application Program Structure
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The entries used for this structure, were chosen
with no special reason. Other combinations could have been
chosen. The only restriction is to position the parent
process at entry off the application mentor.
These entry numbers are treated as paths, when
referenced. So, entry 7 off entry 5 off the system mentor,
is called 5,7. This will be used in the file with the
commands for the sysgening phase. Those entries have to be
passed as parameters during the creation and makeknown of
segments
.
For the application program developed, a segment for
the 'purpose of executing the synchronisation was created,




Process synchronization is accomplished using the
eventcount of the synchronization segment (5,6), and the
eventcount of the stack segment of each child. Advancing
each eventcount in turn, the parent process would prepare
each child to execute its code, as soon as the parent makes
an AWAIT call. The child, would then, after execution.
advance the eventcount of the syncronization segment, which
is the one being read by the parent process . This scheme
would be repeated and the synchronization between all
processes is achieved. The actual sequence of
synchronization used in the programs developed , can be seen
in the programs' listing in Appendix A.
C. GENERATION OF A SECURE PROGRAM
To prepare programs to run in the Gemini Secure
Operating System tGEMSGS) environment is much more
complicated than running a Janus/Ada program in a non-secure
environment. There are some specific calls the program has
to make, in order to be recognized by the GEMSQS , and gain
access to the security kernel. The programs are compiled
and linked like normal Janus/Ada programs. The command
(CMD) files, will then be put in the secure environment. To
assign the security classification and prepare the programs
to run in a secure environment, a secure volume must be
created by running the operating system generation program
(SYSGEN). Execution of the SYSGEN program will include the
application programs into a segment structure, which will
then be transformed into a bootable executable program.
The SYSGEN program reads a submit file to identify the
segment structure. This submit file, for the current
implementation, will have the format as in Figure 4.4.
Except for the application.cmd and the child.cmd files,
all the other segments are to be sysgened exactly as
described in Figure 4.4. The submit file used to SYSGEN the
application program implemented is listed in Appendix E .
File : Application
. ssb
bs : ld3 . cmd
ks : kO . cmd
ks : kl . crad
ks :kOh . cmd
ks : k2 . cmd
cs : vl loader . cmd ; 2
;
ds : vl login. cmd ; 2 , 10
;
ds : nv . ds ; 2 , 5 ;
ds : nv . ds ; 5
;
ds : application . cmd ; 5 , ;
ds : childl
. cmd ; 5 , 7
ds : child2
. cmd ; 5 , 8
it ft it if ii ii if t» if tt ti if it ft tt ft ti
tilt itttti if ft it tt tt tt tt tt tt ft it it
ds : rltrap . cmd ; 6
;
end *
Figure 4.4 Submit File
D. LOSS IN PERFORMANCE
In order to achieve a secure environment, we have
developed our program using four different processes, which
can have different access classes. During the execution of
the secure program, the operating system will perform
security checks each time a process is brought into
execution and each time a segment is accessed. Evidently,
some overhead, in comparison with a non-secure system,
exists . A test program was developed in order to extract
the preliminary measurements of such a overhead.
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1 . Test Program
The same structure used In the application process
developed, was used in this test program.
The algorithm used in the main program is described
in Figure 4.5.







execute calculations with no calls
execute calculations with one call





Figure 4.5 Package TIME
When the procedure to execute calculations with no
calls is activated, the program will perform a simple
arithmetic calculation 30000 times. These calculations will
be performed by the main process, after the creation of all
child processes, and with values already in the main
process, so there, are no GEMSOS calls.
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When the procedure to perform calculations with one
call is activated, the program will activate two processes:
CALC1 and STODISP. The STODISP process will supply one
value to the CALC1 process. CALC1 process will receive this
value and perform the same arithmetic calculation as before
30000 times as well. The actual value passed by one process
to the other is irrelevant, and it is there just to provoke
a call to the operating system during the transmission of
the value. The result of the calculation will be displayed
by the STODISP process
.
Finally, the procedure to perform calculations with
call"' in every loop is activated. The program will then
activate CALC2 and STODISP processes. Process CALC2 will
perform the same calculations as before, but this time will
include in every loop of the computation, a transmission of
data between the STODISP and CALC2 segments.
Because a loop statement is being used to control
these tests, two measurements are taken at the first step
(calculations with no GEMSOS calls), in order to estimate
the contribution of the loop control code to the overall
time taken by the calculation.
All those steps are measured and analysed.
2 . Performance Results
The results obtained from the test program are the
following
:
1) With no GEMSOS calls, 30000 operations => 3.33
seconds
.
2) With four (4) GEMSOS Sails , 30000 Operations = • 3:2,8
seconds
.
3) With four (4) GEMSOS cails for each operation, 300
operations => 23.8 seconds.
At the first step, no GEMSOS calls, another
measurement was taken, doubling the number of operations and
maintaining the same loop number, in order to estimate the
time delay contribution of the loop control. The time
measured was 6.03 seconds, which shows that the actual
operations take 2.7 seconds, and the loop control is
responsible for 0.63 seconds. Since we execute the loop
30000 times, it is possible to estimate the time delay for
each.; loop to be 21 useconds . The times measured show that
each mult/div operation, which there are 12 on each loop, is
using 7.5 useconds, which is the expectable time delay for a
APX-286 CPU.
The time measured during the execution of the second
step, the same number of operations plus four GEMSOS calls,
did not show any appreciable difference.
At the third step, where there are four GEMSOS calls
on each loop, and the loop is executed 300 times, the time
measured was 23.8 seconds. As the test executes the loop
300 times, each loop uses 79 milliseconds. Assuming the
same loop delay time as before, each loop control uses 21
useconds , and the time delay of the actual calculations is
(12 x 7.5 useconds) 90 useconds. Therefore, as four GEMSOS
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calls are executed in each loop, each call uses an average
of 19 milliseconds.
These preliminary measurements are far from
complete, but the results obtained can be considered as a
design parameter to be expected when the security
environment is used with the Gemini system.
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V. APPRECIATION OF RESULTS
A. GENERAL COMMENTS
The development of application programs to execute in
the Gemini microcomputer proved to be much more time
consuming that it was anticipated. Testing and debugging of
the programs could not be done using the techniques and
skills normally used when working with non-secure systems.
Some factors can be listed as the major ones which
contributed to this problem. They were:
1
)
"-'• new terms and concepts that had to be completely
understood before attempting to use the system
2) preliminary version of the manuals provided, which are
still being updated and developed
3) preliminary version of the library programs which do
not include yet, most of the common needed procedures
4) the system used was configured with two floppy disk
drives
.
The Janus/Ada gate calls for the Gemini Secure Operating
System (GEMSOS), are not yet very well explained in the
manuals provided. As such, any time a new call was to be
tested, in order to increase our understanding of a new
concept, the complete process of preparation of a program to
run in a secure environment had to be executed. Since this
process involves the access to a large number of files, the
fact that the system used floppy disk drives , imposed a time
delay of at least 7 minutes
.
As discussed in Chapter III, in order to prepare a
program to run in the secure environment, the operating
system generation program (SYSGEN) had to be executed, whicn
would create a secure volume containing the program segment.
Before running the system generation program, the
application program had to be compiled and linked in the
normal way.
After the creation of the secure volume, the system has
to be reinitialized with the secure application program
volume. If a problem is found in the execution of the
program, the system will either execute an interrupt trap-
halt"" indicating the processor's register contents, or
sometimes will halt completely not giving any indication on
the screen. The error then, must be corrected before any
further progress can be achieved. After the correction has
been made, the preparation process has to be repeated
completely to check if the modification was successful . The
average amount of time from compilation to the final run of
a program, was found to be between 15 to 17 minutes for the
application programs developed in this research.
The use of the modular programming technique is very
important for the compilation and linking phases, but as the
preparation of the secure program has the "sysgening" phase,
where all the modules have to be included, the modularity
does not bring great advantages to the preparation phase.
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Improved versions of the Gemini system will certainly
become available in the near future, which will reduce
significantly the effects of these problems. System
libraries will be expanded, making the process of writing
programs to be run in the secure system less complicated and
time consuming.
B. SYSTEM OPERATION
The system designed proved the possibility of using a
secure computer system as the main building block in a
tactical computer system. The ability of handling different
and somewhat independent processes , easily synchronized by
the "calls already provided by the operating system, was
demonstrated by the model implemented. The actual code of
the modules used do not represent any real application, but
only exemplifies that they can be independently developed,
and integrated into a complete system.
Due to the problems already discussed in the previous
sections, the amount of time for this research, was not
sufficient to proceed with the next step scheduled, which
was, to label one of the processes as secret and then limit
the access based on the security level of the operator
logged on the system.
The use of the system clock to control the
synchronization between the different processes involved in
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the application program could not be completed in time to be
included in this thesis
.
The overhead analysed has shown that an average of 19
miliseconds is used for each GEMSGS call, where
synchronization and security checks are performed. This
time delay has to be taken into account when the tactical
system is designed, but certainly it is not a high price to
pay in order to be able to develop a system with a large
number of security possibilities available.
C. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
In this thesis , a model of a tactical combat system was
developed to demonstrate the possibility of using a
multilevel secure computer system in this environment. The
Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base used in this
research, proved to be able to synchronize the execution of
independent processes which will give the capability of
assigning different security labels to these processes.
Although it has not been possible to achieve all the
desired goals proposed when this thesis was first planned,
the concepts and research done, will certainly facilitate
any further work to be done in this new area.
Most of this research was done in conjunction with
another student, Major Miguel Reyes, working with the same
microcomputer, which to a certain extent guarantees that the
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results here obtained are completely Known by a follow-up
researcher
.
The unit testing of application program modules should
first be accomplished on development systems which have
existing tools for testing the logical correctness and real
time performance. A specially trained "lead programmer"
should take the unit tested modules and incorporate these
into a system's program which synchronizes the units and
produces the necessary communications between the units in a
secure systems environment. The art of systems integration
programming in a secure environment requires an in-depth
understanding of GEMSOS functions as well as the real-time




This application program is compiled and prepared for
execution in the manner discussed in Chapter III. The
program consists of four packages, each one generating a
separate command (CMD) file. The packages to be sysgened as
child processes are designed to have procedures which can be
altered without modifying the overall synchronization of the
application program.
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This package controls the operation of the complete —
system
with arl, alib.i, agate, manag, tables, gemio, alib, crproce;
package tody THIMAIN is





CONSTANT integer := 15
CONSTANT integer := 0?



















































--necessary for all kernel
procedure INITIALIZATION is
begin
— attach serial port for writing
attach_tew (IO_FORT, STDIOJf);
— attach serial port for reading
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attach_ter (IO_PORT, STEI3_P.);
— load parameters to create up to 4 children
load_param_to_4_chld (init, ch_ table )
;
—load access classes for Top-Secret, Secret, Confidential
and Unclassified .
load_access_class (ir.it, ch_level);
— prepare class for accessing main terminal




— creating segment for s tack(parent ) .Will be unclassified
-- so as to obey compatibility property : segment compromise
— must dominate mentor compromise.
mentor := ini t
.
ini tial_seg(2) >
en try* : = f?
;




cr_segment(init,ment or, entryx, size
,
class, sue cess);
if success /= then
put_succ
(




put In (STDIO W,w class, '");
end if;
— makeknown this segment
seg_mode := r_w?
seg_number * = 31
J
mk_segmen t(init, me ntor, entryx,
seg_numter, seg_mode,surcess N ;
if success /= 8 then








— creating synchronization segment . Will be Tcp-Secret.
mentor := ini t . ini tial _seg(2)
;
entry* := 6;
class := init . resources .min_class;
cr_segmen t( init, mentor , entryx , size, class, success);
if success /= £ then
put sncc( "success sync is" .success ,w class);
DUt"ln(STDIO_V,w_class,"");
end if;
— make known this segment
seg_mode := r_w;
seg'numter := 51»
mk_ segment (init,mentor,entryT,seg_numter, seg_mode, success)
;
if success /- then
put succ( "success rrkknown sync" , success ,w class) »




— swapin this segment
swapin_segment( seg_numter .success)
5
if success /= then





procedure PROOFS S_CREATICN is
begin
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class ,"Eegin Process Creation");
type_any_key_to_continue(w_class) ;
— start creating processes in the system
— process 1 == > Radar
— process 2 == N Compute
— process 3 =- > Chaff
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— MOTE :
— all processes with unclassified acess class
— next version to have process 3 changed to Top-Secret in
order
to access Secret data.
for i in 1 . .3 loop








procedure MENU (selection : out integer) is
— Present option to run tactical program or alter date
field
— Data field to secret in next version
begin
then
put_ln (STDIO_V/,w_class ,"?un Tactical
Progran == > < any lrey >"} >
put ln(STDIO_W,w class, "Alter
Data Field == > < A >");
put ln(STDIO W,w class, "Exit Program















put_ln(STDIO_V,w_class ,"Not implemented yet");
end ALTER;
procedure RECEI VE_F^_RADAR is
= i;






Ii"b_rrk:_sel (ldt table.ch table( 1 ) .seg_nurrber_data )
;
def_off := 0?
def size := radar_inpu t 'si ze /6>







~1 i"b_rrk seKldt taMe.ch table(2).seg nurrber data);
def_off := 0;












ch~txable(2) . segx number data )x;
def off := ?\
def'size := chaf f_out 'si ze /8»








def off := «]







pass_rad . flag_z := false?
outer : loop
inner : for i in 1..3 loop
advance(ch_table( i ) .seg_number_s tack, sue cess)
read_ev c ( sy nchr_s eg, evc_ value, success)
await (synctar seg.evc value+1 , success)
5
if i = 1 then
receive_fm_radar?














for i in 1. .7 loop
advance(ch_table(i ) .seg_n urn be r_stack, success)?
read_evc(synchr_seg,evc value .success)
?





for i in 1 . .7 loop
child_delete( i-1 , success)?
t erminate_se gm ent(ch_table(i).s eg _n urn ber_stack, success)?
terrrinate'segrrent ( ch_table( i ) .seg~numterjiata, success; ;
terninate_segrent( ch_table(i).seg_number_code, success)?
delete_segrrent ( ch_ table (i) .mentor_stack,i,success) ?
delete~segme nt( ch_table( i) . me ntor_data,i +4 .success) ?






delete_segment ( ini t .i ni tial_seg(2 ) t 6, success);
terminate_segment (51, success);
delet e_segrrent Unit .ini tial_seg (2 ) , 5, success);
terminate_segment (31 .success);







procedure FRIVINT_T T5.AP is
begin
success : = V'




— ############# MAIN PROGRAM ##############
begin
init := get_rl_def ( )
;








when 1 => alter ;
when 2 => EXIT;







— This package simulates the sampling of a tracker
radar', as an input to a tactical system




package "body RADAR is






































































.radarl := miss_rec .radarl - 50;
rec .radarl < 2000 then
s_rec.radar2 := mi ss_rec ,radar2 - 1)
STDIO_W,w_class, "RANGE ");
STD I0_W,w_cl as s , mi ss_rec .radarl )
;
STDIO_W,w_class ," BEARING " ) ',
STDI0_W ,w_class ,miss_rec .radar2)
STDI0_to ,w_class,char_to_str(character'val(CR) ) )
5










def size := radar input'size /8J





init := get_rl_def ( )
;
— attach terminal to write
attach_tew'I0_FORT,STDIO_V) J
w_class := ini t .resources. min_class 5
— attach terminal to read
attach_ter( IO_PORT ,STP IC_R )
;
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class ," RADAR ")
5





passed to child as ch_seg_lis t ( 2 )
.





ini tial_seg(2 ) .success ) ; — this will
permi t~creati on of processes to go on
read_evc(init.initial_seg(0) ,evc_ch_val, success) » --
stack to sync




control sent tack to creation of processes.
miss_rec .f lag_z := false;
miss_rer .radarl := INIT DIST;
miss_rec.rader2 := INIT^BIARJ
loop
get_trackj — get track information
pass_t o_parent;
ad vance( init. initial seg(2) .success);
read_evc(init.initiaI_seg(0) ,evc_ch_val .success)
;
await (in it. init ial_seg^C),evc_ch_val + l, success);
if miss_rec .f lag_z~then
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advance Cinit.initial_seg(2) .success) 5
— detach and deletion
detach_device(STDIO_R, success )
;





This package performs the actual computations
with arl, manag, gerrio, strlib, agate, tables, ali"b, alibj;
package tody COMPUTE is
use arl, manag, gemio, strlib, agate, tables, alit, alibj;
— constants
STDIO W : CONSTANT integer
STDIO~R : CONSTANT integer
10 PORT : CONSTANT integer





























def seg := lib_mk_sel ( Id t_table , init .initial seg(3) )
J
def_off := 0?








def_seg := lib_mk_sel( ldt_table , ini t
.
initial_seg(3 )) ;
def off := 05
def~size := chaff out'size /8J
move l;ytes( get ssO.che out'ADDRESS,





put str(STI)IO_W\w class ," Commuting ... ");
put_str(STDIO_W,w_class
,
char t b str
(
character 'val (CR )) )
;
cha_out . chaff 1 : =
( ( rad_in .radarl/1000) ::: ship_rec.paraml)+7 5;




ship_rec .paraml := 2;
init := get_rl_def ( );
— attach terminal to write
attach_tew ( I0_P0RT .STDIOJO;
w_class := init .resources. min_class;
—attach terminal to read
attach_ter( I0_P0RT , STD 10 _R )
5
put_ln(STPIO_W,w_class," COMPUTE ");
— advance event count of synchro segment path 5,6 plsn 51
— passed to child as rh_seg_list(2 )
.
— Will he called in child as init . init ial_seg( 2)
advance (init. initialises (2) , success)
;
re ad _ ev c( init. initial _s eg (0), eve _ch_ val, success);
await (init. initial_seg(0) t evc_ch~val+l , success )
5




if rad in.radarl < 1500 then
put_ln(STDIO_W,w class,"");












ad van ce(init.initial_seg(2), success);
— dettach and delete
detach_device(STDIO_R, success);




— This package simulates the driving of a weapon device —
with arl, maneg, gemio, agate ,strlit, tatles, alifc, alitj ;
package tody CHAFF is


































def seg := lit mk sel( Id t_tetle , init .initial seg(3));
def'off := 05
def'size := chaf f_out' size /8J
move tytes(def seg ,def _of f , get ss(),





init := get_rl_def ( )
;
— attach terminal to write
attach_tew(IC_PORT,STCIO_V/);
w_class := init .resources. min_class;
— attach terminal to read
attach ter( IO_PORT ,STD 10 R);
put_lnrSTDIO_W,w_class ," CHAFF");
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advance eventcount of sync segment path 5,6 plsn 51
passed to child as ch seg list(2).
Will te called in child ai ir it . ir it ial_seg( 2)
advance (in it . initial_seg(2) .success )
»
read_evc(init .initial_seg(0) ,evc_ch_val .success)
;
await(init.initial_seg(0) , evc_ch_val+l .success )
;


















dec(STDIO_W,v_class,cha c on t .chaff 1)
;
str(STDI0 W,v_class," FIIVATION ");
dec(STDIO~V,v_class,cha_cont.chaf f2 )





_evc( init. ini tial_seg(0),evc_ch_val, svc cess);
t(init.initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val+l, success);




cha~cont .f lag_z := false;
if;
put ln(STDI0 W f w class,"");
put_ln(STDIO_V,v~class," PARKED " )
5
advance(init.initial_seg(2) .success)
— dettach and delete









These packages were built in order to concentrate all
common procedures used for the application program developed
in this research. They are far from complete, although tney
establish the organization necessary to develop secure
applications programs. Some of the procedures included in
this library were taken from the demonstration program
supplied by the manufacturers of the Gemini computer.
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— Specification for the MANAG package
Contains procedures to handle segments
with agate, agatej, arl , utilS
package MANAG is










: in access class;
success: out integer );
procedure MK_SEG^ENT ( init : in rl_pr ocess_def ;
mentor: in integer;
entrx : in integer;
number : in integer;
mode : in seg_access_type ;
success : out integer );
procedure ATTACK_TSV( IO_PORT : in integer;
LDEV : in integer);
— attach to write; IO_FCRT is physical device ;
LDEV is logical device
procedure ATTACH TER ( IO_PORT : in integer;
LDEV : in integer) ;
— attach to read; I0_P0RT is physical device
LDEV is logical device
procedure t24_ERM_INTEGER (ir_val : in integer;
t24_val : out b24_type );
end MANAG;
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This package has procedures to handle segments
and terminals
with agate, agatej, arl, utilj
package tody MANAG is
use agate, agatej, arl, util;
— Constants for device slots.
STDI0_W : CONSTANT integer := 15
STEIO R : CONSTANT integer := 0;
10 FORT : CONSTANT integer := ?
;















cr_seg_str : rreate_seg_s truct ;
begin
cr_seg_str .ment or := mentor;
cr_seg_str .entryx := entnJ
cr_seg_st r .1 imi t := size;
cr_seg_str .class := class;
create_segment ( cr_seg_str, success );
end CR SIGMINTJ






— Makekncwn segment call






: in seg_access_type ;




seg_rec .mentor := mentor?
seg~rec. entry* := entrx;
seg_rec . seg_number := number;
seg_rec . seg_mode := mode;
seg_rec .prot_level := byte( 1 ); — ring 1
protection
seg_rec .ga te_number := NULL_INEEX; —no gate
seg^rec .gate'prot := byte*" )5
makekr. own_segmert ( seg_rec, seg_ret_rec, success )>
end MK SEGMENT;
proredure ATTACH_TIW ( I0_P0RT : in integer ;
LDEV : in integer) is
attach serial port writing





mode .siow_rec .dev_num := io_port; --physical device




iow_rec . dev_id := LDEV; —logical device
mode .si cw_rec .mrl := byte( 15#04D# ); —device
conf igurati on
mode.siow_rec.mr2 := byte( 16#03E# );
mode .s iow_rec . i o_mode := asrt_rtsJ
a ttach_device( mode, success );
end ATTACH TEW;
procedure ATTACH_TER( I0_P0RT : in integer;
LDEV : in integer) is
attach serial port for reading.
mode_r : at tach_s truct ;
success : integer;
begin
mode_r .dev_name := sior;
mode_r
. si or_rec .dev_num := io_port;
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mode_r . sior_rec .dev_type : = ioi
mode_r .si or_rec .dev_id := LDEV5
mcde_r . si or_rec .mrl := "byte( 15#04D# );
mode_r.sior3rec.mr2 := byte( 16#03E# );
mode_r . si cr_rec . io_mode := asrt_dtr;
mode_r
.
sior_rec.delim_ac tive := FALSE;
mode_r . sior~r.ec .delimiter := tyte( 13 );
mode_r . sior_rec. maximum := 1> — only reads one
character at a time.
attach_device( mode_r, success )»
end ATTACH_TIR;
procedure o24_ERM_INTEGER (in_val : integer;
b24_val . : cut c24_type) is
— to convert an integer into a t24_type variable (3 tytes)
begin
b24 val.ryte2 := byte( £ )
J
b24_val.tytel := hi( in val );






with agate, agatej, strlib ;
package GEMIO is
use agate, agatej, strlib ;













procedure PUT_STR ( ldev
w class
str











in integer ) ;
in string;
in integer;
in access class )
;
procedure Ti FI_ANi _OY _TO_CONTINUE (w_class : in
access_class) ;
procedure 3LK_SCR ( ldev : in integer;
w class : in access class);
end GEMIO;
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This package contains procedure to handle I/O
with agate, agatej, strlit;
package tody GEMIO is
use agate, agatej, strlit;
STDIO W : CONSTANT integer := 1?
STDIO~R : CONSTANT integer := 0?





in string ) is
put a string on device ldev with cr and If
cut_tuf : 5tring( 32 );
success : integer?
wt_sio : wt_seq_struct ;
size.-str : integer;
CR : "CONSTANT integer := 135


































t-uf S, char to
7= ldev;
f := out_buf 'ADDRESS +
g := get_ss( );
= size_str + 2 J
= w_class ;
al( wt sio, success );
str( character 'val
(








procedure GIT_STR ( ldev : in integer;
class : out acress_class;
str : out string") is
get a string fror device ldev





size str : integer;
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BIG IN
rd_sio .data_off := ln.buf 'ADDRESS + 15
rd~sio .device := IdevT
rd~sic .data_seg := get_ss();
read_sequential ( rd_sio t rd ret, success )»
in_buf( ) := charac ter 'val( rd_ret. count );
str := in_buf;
r_class := rd_ret .class ;
end GET STRJ
procedure PUT_STR ( ldev : in integer!
w_class : in access_class ;
str : in string ) i s
put a string on device ldev.
out_tuf : string?
success : integer?




size_str := ler.gth( str );
wt_sio .device := ldev;
wt_sio .data_off := out_buf ADDRESS + 1J
vt_sio .data_seg := get_ss();
wt_sio. count := size_str;
wt_sio. class := w_class;
wri te_sequen tial ( wt_sio, success );
end PUT STR;
procedure PUT_DEC( ldev : in integer;
w_class : in access_class ;
dval : in integer ) is
put the string equivalent of a integer on the terminal
screen.
out_buf : string( 10 );
begin
out_buf := Int_to_str( dval );
put_str( ldev ,~w_class , out_buf );







in access class ) is
print a string and an integer on device attached in
slot STDIO_W
(should he a serial terminal).
hegin
put_str( STDI0_W, w_class, in_str );
T)ut_dec( STDI0~W, v_class, dec val );







put_str (STDIO Y.',w class, tj-pe any key to continue");
get's tr (5TDI0~R,rd_class ,rd_str) ;
put~ln (STDI0_£, v_class,rd_str) ;
end TYPE ANY KEY TO CONTINUE 'J
1 n
procedure ELX_SCR ( ldev : in integer;
w_class: in access_class ) is
— clear screen and home cursor
out_huf : string;
success :i^teger;
wt sio : wt seq_struct;
ESC : CONSTANT integer





out_tuf :=out_buf & char_to_str (character 'val (F) )
;
wt sio. device := ldev;
vt~sic .data_off :=out_tuf 'ADDRESS + 1?
wt~sio .data_seg:=get_ss ( ) J
w t sio .count :=25
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wt_sio. class :-w_class;






























type R1_FARAM is array (1 . . MAX_F?.OC ) of rl_paramet er s ;
type LEVEL RECORD is record
nin " : access_class J
max : access_class J
end record;
type USER_LEVEL is array (0 . . PAX_LEVELS ) of level_rec ord ;






type RADAR_ INPUT is record
: CONSTANT integer := 45
: CONSTANT in teger := 4;
CONSTANT integer := I?
• CONSTANT integer := 2;
CONSTANT in teger := 3;
















































procedure LOAD_ACCESS_CLASS ( init : in rl_process_def ;
usr access : out user level);
end TABLIS;
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This package loads the parameters for the segments
Also loads security parameters
with agate, arl 5
package tody TAPLIS is
use agate, arl ;
procedure LOAD_PARAM_TO_4_CHLD ( init : in rl_process_def i
ch_para : out rl_param) is
— load the segments specifications
INITIAL : CONSTANT integer := 31
J




.for i in 1 . . 4 1 oop
prep .entry_s tack := i»
prep. mentor stack := INITIAL;
prep .seg_number_stack := INITIAL + i»
prep.seg_numter~code := INITIAL + i + 4;
prep.en try_code := i +6;
prep.ment or_code := init .initial_seg (2)
>
prep .entry_data := i + 4;
prep. mentor data := INITIAL;
prep.seg_number_data := NEXT_NUMEER_EREE + i - 1J
ch_para (i ) : = prep;
end loop;
end LOAD PARAM TO 4 CHLD ;
procedure LOAD_ACCESS_CLASS ( init : in rl_process_def ;
usr access : out user level ) is





usr_level. mi n. compromise. in tl
usr~level.min.integrity.int0
usr~level.min.integrity.intl













usr access(TOF SECRET) := usr level;
usr_level .min.compromise.int?
usr~level . mi n. compromise .intl
usr_level.min.integrity.int0
usr_level .min. integrity. intl
usr_ level .max .compromise .into
usr "level .max .c ompromise .intl
usr_level.max.integrity.int0









usr access(SECRET) := usr level;
usr_level.min.compromise.int0
usr_level .min. com promise, intl
usr_level.min.integrity.int0
,usr_level. min. integrity, intl
"usr "lev el .max .compromise .int0











usr access(CONFIDENTIAL) := usr level;
usr_level . mi n. compromise .int0
usr~level.min. compromise .intl
usr_level.min.integrity.int0
usr_level .min. integrity, intl
usr_level.max.compromise.int0
usr_level. max. compromise. intl
usr_level.max.integrity.int0










end LOAD ACCESS CLASS?
end TAPLES;
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Specification for the Create Process Package
with agate, agatej, arl, alib, alibj, rranag, gemio, tables;
package CRPROCE is
use agate, agatej, arl, alio, alibj, manag, gemio, tables;
procedure FILL_INIT( init : in rl_process_def ;
ch_init : out rl_process_def ;
ch_access : in level_record ).
;
procedure TO_CRZATI_PROCISS( init : in rl_process_d ef
;
ch_para : in rl_parameters ;
ch_access : in 1 evel_rec ord
;
prcces : in integer?
synchr_seg : in integer;
success : out integer);
end CRPROCE;
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This package contains the procedure to create
processes
with agate, agatej, arl, alib, alibj, gerr.io, manag, tables;
package body CRFROCE is
use agate, agatej, arl, alit, alibj, gemio, manag, tables?
— Constants for device slots.
5TDIC W : CONSTANT integer := 15
3T2IO~R : CONSTANT integer := 0;
IO_PORT : CONSTANT integer := 0; — port zero for main
process
procedure FILL_INIT( init : in rl_proces s_def
;
ch_init : out rl_process_def ;
ch_access : level_record ) is
fill in the initial process record of a child
process .
— - called by t o_create_prccess
begin
ch_init.cpu := init.cpu;
ch_init .num_cpu := init . num_cpuj
ch_ini t .nurr_kst := init . num_>st
;
ch_ini t .root_access := in it . root_access ;
ch_ini t .s_seg : - 3 5
ch_ini t .resources. pri ori ty := ini t
.
resources .priority ;
— same as parent .
b24_f rm_integer( 60, ch_init .resources .memory );
ch_init .resources .processes := 2J
ch_ini t .resources
.
segmn ts := 103?
this will be modified with the specific access class of
each process
ch_ini t .resources .min_class := ch_access .mini
ch_ini t .resources. max^class := ch^access .max
;
ch_init.rirg num := byte( 1 );
ch_ini t.sp2 7= 0;
end FILL INITJ
procedure T0_CREATF_PR0CZS3 ( init : in rl_process_def ;
ch_par : in rl_paramet er s
;
ch access : in level record;
88
proces : in integer?
synchr_seg : in integer!
success : out integer ) is
process creation
chld_seg : rl_seg_struct J — rl_addr_array for child's
segment
rh_init : rl_process_def ! — rl_process_def for child
seg_rec : create_seg~struct ! — used to criate stack segment




crt_rec : rl_cp_struct ; — create process structure
ch_seg_list : seg_array;
w_clasl : access_class !
evc_value : integer!
stack_size : integer!




— constants for determining stack size
rl stack size : CONSTANT integer := 15#FFF#!
vect_size : CONSTANT integer := 4!
3ESIN
w_class i- ch_access .min
!
segl_mkn .men tor := ch_par .ment or_code !
segl'mkn .entryx := ch_par .entry_code !
segl_mkn. seg_number := ch_par . sig_numter_code
!
segl_mkn . seg_mode := r_e
segl~mkn.prot_level := byte( 1 }!
segl_mkn.gate~numDer := NULL_INDrX! — no gate
makeknown_segment ( segl_mkn, segl_ret, success )!
if success /= then
put_succ
(





address spec for child's stack
chld_seg. seg_numter := ch_par . seg_numter_stack!
cnld^seg. seg_mode := r_w!
rhld"seg. swapin := TRUE!
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chld_seg. protect :.= byte( 1 );
crt_rec.rl_addr_array ( 8 ) := chld_seg;
address spec for child's code
chld_seg. seg_number := ch_par. seg_number_code;
chid seg.seg mode := r e;
chld'seg. swapin := TRUE;
chld_seg.pro tec t := byte( 1 )»
crt_rec .rl_addr_array ( 1 ) := chld_segj
address spec for child's mentor
chld_seg . seg_number := syr.chr_seg;
chld~seg. seg]V,ode := n_a;
chld"seg. swapin := TRUE;
chld'seg. protect := byte( 1 );
crt_rec . rl_addr_array ( 2 ) := chld_segJ
address spec for trap handler segment
chld_seg. seg_number := init . in itial_seg(4) ;
chid seg.seg mode := r_e;
chld~seg. swapin := TRUE;
chld_seg. protect := byte( 1 );
crt _rec ,rl_addr_array ( 4 ) := chld_seg;
address spec for child's data




chld_seg. seg_mode := r_w
;
chld^seg. swapin := TRUE;
chld'seg.pro tect := byte( 1 );
crt_rec .rl_addr_array ( 2 ) := chld_segj


















calculate required stack size.
(in the future will calculate based on data in "CMD'
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file header
"but now just use constant.)
seg mgr "bytes := ( stack header 'SIZE/8 ) x




stack_size := rl_stack_si ze + vect_size + seg_mgr_tytes
+
( rl_process_def SIZE/8 )J
create ani make known child's stack segment
seg_rec .mentor := ch_par .mentor_stack ;
seg_rec
.
entryx := ch_par .entry _stack;
seg_rec.lini t := stack_size - 1J
seg_rec .class := ch_access .min I
create_segment ( seg_rec, success )J
if success /= then
put_succ( "success value chsta is " .success ,w_class )
;
put ln(STEIO W,w_class,"") ;
end if!
segl_mkn .men t or := ch_pa
r
.ment or_stack;
segl_mkn .entryx := ch_par .entry_stack;
segljnkn . seg_numcer := ch_par . seg_num"ber_st ack;
segl^mkn. seg~mode := r_w;
segl mkn .prot_level := tyte( 1 );
segl~mkn.gate_r.umner := NULL INDEX;
segl_mkn .gate_prot := tyte( );
makekn own_segment ( segl_mkn, segl_ret, success )>
if success /= then
put succ( "success value mksta is ", success ,w_cla ss )
put~ln(STDIO W,w_class,"") ;
end if;
swapin_segment ( ch_par. seg_number_stack , success );
if success /= then





success , w class ) I
put ln(STLIO_W,w class,"");
end if T
create and make known child's date segment
seg_rec .ment cr := ch_pa
r
.men t cr_data ;
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seg_rec .entry* := ch_par . entry _data>
seg_rec .limit := test_message'si ze/8;
seg_rec .class := ch_access .mi 1-
;
create_segment ( seg_rec, success )»
if success /= then
put succ( "success value chdat is ", success, w class);
put"ln(STDIO W,w class,"");
end ifT
segl_mkn. mentor := ch_par .ment or_da ta;
segljT'kn .ertryx := ch~par .entry_data;
segl_mkn. seg_num"ber := ch_par. seg_numter_da ta
;
segl_mkn . seg_mode := r_w?
segl'mkn .prot_level := cyte( 1 );
segl~mkn.gate_numter := NULL_INDFX;
segl_mkn .gste_prot := byteT );
makeknown_segment ( segl_mkn, segl_ret, success );
if success /= then
put_succ( "success value mkdat is ", success ,w_class) 5
put~ln(STDIO_W,w class,"");
end if;
swapir_segment ( ch_par. seg_!uimber_data , success );
if success /- 7i then
put _succ( "success value swadat is ", success, w class);
put~ln( STT IO_W,w_c lass ,"" )
;
er.d if;
fill in childs rl_process_def
fill_init( init, ch_init, ch_access )t
determine segment and offset of rl_process_def initial
record
def_seg := lib_mk_sel( ldt_table,
ch par . seg_numcer_stack );
def off := stack size - ( vect size + seg mgr bytes +
rl_process_def 'SIZE/S );
move ch_init into proper place in child's stack segment
rl_def_size := ( rl process_def 'SIZE )/S;
move_bytes( get_ss(J, ch_init 'address , def seg, def_off,
rl def size );
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— fill in remainder of create_pr ocess_structure
crt rec.ip := 128? — skip command
file header* (82 hex)
crt_rec.spx := def_off? — set childs stack
pointer
crt rec.spl := stack size - ( vect size + seg mgr tytes
" '
)?
crt_rec.sp2 := 0? — no ring 2 stack
crt_rec .vec_seg := 0? — rl address array
element 2
crt_rec.vec off := stack_size - vect_size?
crt^rec ,child_num := proces-1?-
crt_rec .priority := ch_init .resources. priority?
crt_rec .memory := ch_init .resources .memory?
crt_rec .processes := ch_init .resources .processes ?
crt~rec . segmnt s := ch_ir.it .resources . segmnt s?
crt_rec .min_class := ch_init .resources .min_class ?
crt~rec .max_class := ch~init .resources .max_class ?
read event count so we prepare for synchronization
f ~~read_evc( synchr_seg,evc_value , success )?
create the process




put_succ( create process success = ", success,
w class )?
end if?








This program was developed following the general format
of the application program in Appendix A. The preparation
of this program to execute in the secure environment 'is done
in the same way as the application program.
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This package controls the operation of the test
— progr=~
with arl, alio, alicj, agate, strlit, mar.ag, tatles, gemio,
crproce ;
package tody T3TI M 3 is
use arl, alit, alitj
,
































































— attach serial port for writing
attach_tew (I0_?ORT, STDIOJf)!
— attach serial port for reading
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attach_ter (IO_FORT f STDIO_R);
— load parameters to create up to 4 children
load_param_to_4_chld (init, ch_tatle);
—load access classes for Top-Secret, Secret, Confidential
and Unclassified .
load_access_class (init, ch_level);
— prepare class for accessing main terminal




— creating segment for s tackfparent ) .Will be unclassified
— so as to obey compatibility property : segment compromise
— must dominate mentor compromise.
mentor := i ni t . ini tial_seg(2)
;
entry* := 55




cr_segment ( init ,ment or , entryx, size, class, sue cess)
»
if success /= then
put_succ
(
"success stack parent ", success ,w_class )
;
put In (STDIO W,w class, '")
J
end if?
— makeknown this segment
seg_mode := r_w;
seg_number := 31;
mk_ segment (init, mentor, entryx ,seg_number ,seg_mode .success) ;
if success /= then
put_succ( "success makekenovn stack
parent" ^success
, w_classj;




— creating synchronization segment .
mentor := ini t .ini tial_seg(2 )
;
entry* := 6;
class := init .resources .min_class»
cr_segmen t
(
init, ment or, entryx, size, class, success);
if success /= then





— makeknown this segment
seg_mcde := r_w;
seg_numter := 51?
mk_ segment (init ,men tor, entryx, seg_numter , seg_mode .success )
;
if success /= then





— swapin this segment
swapin_segment ( seg_number, success) ;
if success /= then
put_succ( "success swapin sync"
,








put_ln(STCIO_V,w_class ."Begin Process Creation");
type_any_key_to_continue(w_class )
;
— start creating processes in the system
— process 1 == > Store and Display
— process 2 == > Calcl -> one field passed
— process 3 == > Calc2 -> field passed every loop
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for i in 1..3 loop
ch_tac '= ch_table( i ) ;
ch~lev := ch~level(4);
to_create_process(init,ch_tab,




procedure MENU (selection : out integer) is
— Fresent option to execute each timing program
begin
put ln(STEI0 V,w cla ss , "Execute with no GEMSOS calls");
put"ln(STDIO_W,w"class
,




=> < 1 >");
put_ln (STDIO_W ,v class , "Exerute passing data 4 times");
-put~ln(STDlO_V,w~class , "12 mult/div t 30000 times");
'put~ln(STDIO_V,v~class ," => < 2 >");
put ln(STDIO_W,w cla ss
,
"Execute passing data p/ loop");
put"ln(STDIO~V,w~class , "12 mult/div , 300 times*');
put_ln(STDIO_W,w class," => < 3 >");
put~ln(STDIO_W,v~class, "Exit => < 4 >");
get_str(STPIO_P. ,rd_class,in_choice);
if in_choice = "l" then
selection. := 1
;
elsif in_choice = "2" then
selection := 2;
elsif in_choice = "3" then
selection := 3;








put_ln(STPIO_W,w_class ," Prep to time ... ");







char_to_str (character 'val (3 EL) ) )
I
put_ln(STDIO_V,w_class,"S TO?");





lib miC_sel ( ldt tat le ,cn_table( 1 ) . seg_r.umber_data) I
def_off := 0J
.def^size := tes t_message 'si ze /SJ








lib_mk sel(ldt table.ch table (2) .seg number lata);
def_off := 0;
def'size := test_message 'size /B »
move_bytes





def _seg:=lib_mk_sel( Id t_ table
,
ch_table(2 ) . seg nurrber data);
def_cff := ?;
def_size := test_message 'si ze /8»
move_bytes(def_seg t def_off,get_ss( )
,






, ch_table(3) . seg_number_dat a)
;
def off := 0;
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def _seg:=lib_mk_sel (Id t,_ table ,
ch ta"ble(3).seg number data);
def_off := 0;
"
def_size := tes t_mes sage 'si ze /S;
move_"bytes(def_seg f def_off,get ss( ) ,













def_seg,def_of f ,ief _si ze) ;
end PASS TO STO ;
procedure CALC_NO_CALLS is
FIRST : CONSTANT integer := 10000;














in 1. .70000 loop
test_rec .result := ({
test_rec . result := (
(
test_rec . result := ((






10000 / 500 )
10000 / 500 )
1^000 / 500 )









do the same operation
n(STDIO_V,w_class /'calculate the loop control
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(( 10 00 / 500 ) ; ': 300 / 1C0;
(( 10000 / 500 : 300 ) / 100;
(( 10000 / 500 : rj« 300- ) / 100;
(( 10000 / 500
'
I
# 300 ) / 100;
(( 10000 / 500 )
Jg 300 )i / 100;
(( 10000 / 500 ) 'i* 300 ) / 100;
(( 10000 / 500 ] * 300 ) / 100;






advance (ch_ tab led ) . seg_number_ stack, success)
;













re ad_evc ( synch r_seg, eve _ value , success )
?




ad v an ce(ch_ tabled"1 . seg_numter_s tack, success)
re ad _evc( synchr_seg, eve" value, success);
await(synchr_seg,evc_value+l,success);

















in 1. .300 loop
dvance(ch_table( 1) . seg_num be r_ stack , success) i
















test _rec .flag := true;
for i in 1 . .? loop
def_seg :=
lib mk sel (ldt table, ch tabled ) .seg number data) 5
def_off := 0;~
def~size := tes t_message 'si ze /S»
move_bytes (def_seg,def_off,get_ss(),
test_rec 'ADDRESS, def_size) ;
advance^ ch_table(i) . seg_numter_s tack, success )
;
read_evc(synchr_seg,evc_value,success);
a wait( synch r_seg,evc_value+l, success);







for i in 1 . .3 loop
child_delete(i-l, success);
terminate_ segment (ch_ table ( i ) . seg_number_stack, success )
t er rrin a te_ segment (ch_table(i).seg_nurrber_data, success);
termir. ate_segmer. t( ch_table(i) . seg_number_c ode .success ) ;
delete_ segment (ch_table(i). men tor_stacV:,i, sue cess);




ment (ch_table (i).mentcr_code,i +6, success) ;






delete_segmen t (init .i ni tial_seg(2 ) , 6, success);
terminate_segrrent (51, success);


















— ######## MAIN PROGRAM ########*########
tegin
init := get_rl_def ( ) J —must be the first statement
lit set_"bra eke t(l, 1,1, in it .resources .mi n_c lass )
»
ini tiali zat ion;
stack _ar.d__sync_creation;
process_creation ;




when 1 => calc_no_calls;
when 2 => calc_one_pass;
when 3 => calc^pass.all
;
when 4 => exit;








— This Package simulates the stcre process in the test
— program
with arl, manag, gemio, agate, tables, alib, alibj;
package tody STODISF is





CONSTANT integer := 1J
CONSTANT integer := 0;




















def seg := lib mk_se 1( Id t_table
, init .initial seg(3) )
5
def'off := 0;
def_size := test message 'size /8;










def_size := tes t_message 'si ze /8
;




def _ of f
,
def_size);
end PASS TO PARENT ;
104
— MA I N PROGRAM
begin
init := get_ri_def ( )
;
— attach terminal to write
attach_tev ( I0_P0RT ,STDI0_W );
v_clasi := init. resources .min_class;
—attach terminal to read
attach_ter(IO_PCRT,STDIO_R);
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class," STORAGE AND DISPLAY RIADY " )
',
— advance eventccunt of synchro segment path 5,6 plsn 51
— passed to child as ch seg_list(2).
— Will he called in chiTd as init . initial_seg(2)
advance (init.initial_seg(2) , success )
J
,read_evc(init.initial_s eg (2'),evc_ch_val t su cress);
'a waitdnit. in itial_seg(2\evc_ch_val+l, success);
loop
pass_to parent;






















ad van ce( in it. initial _s eg (2) , success)
;
— dettach and delete







— This package performs one of the timing tests
with arl, manag, gemio, agate, tatles, alit, alitj;
package tody CALC1 is
use arl, manag, gemio, agate, tatles, alit, alitj;
— constants
STDIO_W : CONSTANT integer := 1!
STDIO'E : CONSTANT integer := 05




















def_seg := lit mk_sel( Id t_tatle , init. initial seg(3))5
def_off := 0;
def_size := test_message 'si ze /&',
move_tytes (def _seg,def off, get ss(),








al_seg( 3 ) )
;
def'eff := 0;
def size := tes t_mes sage 's i ze /S
;
move_tytes(get_ss( ) ,test_rec 'ADDRESS,
def_seg,def_off,def_size);




in it := get_rl_def ( )
;
— attach terminal to write
attcch_tew (10 PORT, STDIC_V.')
;
w_class := iniT .resources7min_class ;
— attach terminal to read
attach_ter( I0_P0RT ,STDI0_R ) ;
put_ln(STDIO_W,w_class , " CALC ONI PASS READY ");
— advance evertcount cf synchro segrert path 5,5 plsn 51
— passed to child as ch_seg_lis t (2 )
.
— V.' ill he called in child as init.initial_seg(2)
advance (init.initjal_s eg (2), success);
read_evc (init . in itial_seg(0 ) , eve _ch_val
,
success);
await ( in it . in i tial_seg(0) , evc_ch_val+l .success )
;
loop
receive _fn_p a rent;
if test_rec .f lag then
exit;
end if;









10000 / 500 )
= (
f
10000 / 500 )
= ( ( 10000 / 500 )







300 ) / 100;
pass_to parent;









ad va nee (init .initial_segf 2) , success);
— dettach and delete
detach_device(STDIO_R, success);





with arl, manag, gemio, agate , tables , alib, alibj?
package tody CALC2 is
use arl, manag, gerrio, agate , tables , alit, alibj?
— constants
STDIO V : CONSTANT integer := 1J
STDIO~R : CONSTANT integer := 0?











def size * : integer?
procedure PASS_TO_PARENT is
begin
def_seg := lib mk_sel
(
ldt_table, init . initial seg(3))?
def_off := 0?













def_size := test_message 'si ze /8?
rnove_bytes(def seg t def _of f ,get ss(),





init := get_rl_def ()
;
— attach terminal to write
attach_tew( I0_P0RT , STDIOJf )
;
w_class := ini t
.
resources. min_class;
— attach terminal to read
attach_ter(IO_?ORT,STDIO_R);
put_ln(STCIO_W,w_class," CALC2 PASS EVERY LOOP READY");





passed to child as ch_seg_list ( 2 )
.
— Will "be recognized in child as ini t . init ial_seg(2 ) .
advance ( ini
t
.initial_seg(2 ) .success ) ; — this will
permit creation of processesto go on
"r ead_e vc (init. initial_s eg (0), eve _ch_val, success);
stack to sync
await (init. iritial_s eg (0) , eve _ch_val+l , success )
;




if test_rec . f lag then
exit;
end if;
test rec. result := ({ 1000? / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
test'rec. result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
test_rec .result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
test_rec. result := (( 10000 / 500 ) * 300 ) / 100;
pass^to parent;
ad vanceTinit. initial _s eg (2), success);
read_evc( ini t.initial_seg(0) f evc_ch_val, success);
await( init. initial_seg(0),evc_ch_val+l, success);
end loop;









SIMPLE ACCESS PROGRAM LISTING
This program presents a very simple program, with the
purpose to show the basic steps necessary to be able to
access the secure system. Different from non-secure
systems, the terminal is not automatically a part of the
system, and as shown in this program, a GEMSOS gate call is
necessary to include a terminal in the system.
Ill
Sample program to access the system
pragma rangecheck( off ); pragma debug( off ); pragma
arithcheck( off );
pragma enumtab( off )>
WITH agate, arl, alibj, util, manag ,gemio;
PACKAGE BODY alo IS
USI agate, arl, alibj, util, manag ,gemio ;
— Constants for device slots.
STDIO V : CONSTANT integer := 1J
STDI0~R : CONSTANT integer := 0;
IO_FORT : CONSTANT integer := 0J
process
— port zero for ma in
— Variables used by main program.
w_class : access_cl ass ; — AGATE
init : rl_procesi_def ; — AR1
mentor : integer »
entrx : integer ;
size : integer ;
success : integer?
class : access_class J
seg_mode : seg_access_type ; —AGATE
seg number : integer »
— MAIN
3FGIN
init := get_rl_def ( ) ; — AR1
lib_set_bracket ( 1, 1, 1, init .resources .min_clas s )5
attach serial port for writing.
attach_tew( I0_F0RT, STDI0_V )» —MANAG
w_class := ini t . resources .min_class ;
put_ln(stdio_w,w_class, HELLO COMPLICATED WORLD");
attach serial port for reading.
attach_ter( IO_FORT, stdio_r); — MANAG
put_ln( stdio_v/,w_class ,"now I will create a segment");
type_any_key_to_continue (w_ class ) 5
112
— creating segment for STACK (parent)
mentor := init . initial_seg(2 ) ;
entrx :=5;
size :=10235
class := init .resources. min_class 5
cr_segment ( init , mentor, entrx, size, class, success);
put_ln( stdi o_w,w_class ,"now I will
make the segment known ");
type_any_key_to_continue (w_class) 5
— makeknown segment created
seg_mode := r_w?








put_ln(stdio_w ,w_class , " Ate logo (good bye)");
— infinite loop to prevent trap.
success := 0»







This appendix presents the submit files used for the
sysgening of the application program, the testing program
and the simple access program.
114











ds: radar. cmd; 5,7;
ds: compute .cmd » 5 ,6;
ds:chaf f .cmd;5,9;
ds rrltrap. cmd ;6»
end
115























nv .ds ]2 ,5;
".v.dsJ5;
totime. cmd ;5,0;
stodisp .cmd ; 5 ,7;
calcl.cmd »5 t S»
calc2.cmd;5,9;
rltrap. cmd ; 6J
116













ds :nv .d s55;
ds ;al o. cmd
;
5,0;
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